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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
contended, the state wishes to see successful businesses, why should the
courts interfere?
The court upheld the restriction here, but it seems that it did so by.
faulty logic and improper application of the old rules. Thus, while the
case may indicate the court's desire to validate such restrictions, it is
submitted that a better means should have been used: the old rules should
have been directly overruled or declared inapplicable.
Michael A. Macchiaroli
EOUITY-PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION- FEDERAL COURT WILL NOT
ENJOIN TRANSFER OF TAXPAYER'S DEPOSIT IN NEW YORK BANK'S
BRANCH OFFICE LOCATED OUTSIDE UNITED STATES WHERE COURT
DID NOT HAVE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER TAXPAYER.
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank (2d Cir. 1963)
The United States moved for a preliminary injunction in an action
involving the income tax liability of a foreign corporation. The complaint
named as defendants the delinquent taxpayer, and various banks which
were holders of sums for the account of or to the credit of the taxpayer.
The complaint demanded that the district court adjudge the taxpayer
indebted to the government, find a valid lien existing in favor of the
plaintiff on all property or rights to property belonging to the taxpayer,
and enjoin the other defendants from in any way transferring or disposing
of such property. There was no personal jurisdiction over the foreign
taxpayer. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining
defendants from transferring or disposing of any property or rights to
property held for the taxpayer, whether or not located within the United
States.' Defendant, First National Bank of New York (hereinafter re-
ferred to as Citibank) appealed from the order as it applied to property
or rights to property that it held in branch banks outside the United States.
Citibank contended that the district court was without jurisdiction to
issue a preliminary injunction affecting foreign deposits, since the property
was outside the jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals 2 held that since the
taxpayer's deposit in Citibank's branch was collectible only outside the
1. United States v. Omar, S.A., 210 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
2. The majority opinion was written by Circuit Judge Moore, joined by Circuit
Judge Friendly. Circuit Judge Hays dissented. Affirmed on rehearing.
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United States, the foreign deposits were beyond the district court's equity
jurisdiction. United States v. First Natl City Bank, 321 F.2d 14 (2d
Cir. 1963).
The enforcement provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
equip the federal government with several methods of collection from a
delinquent taxpayer. At the time assessment is made, a lien arises upon
all of the taxpayer's property and rights to property.3 This lien may be
enforced by levying on the property, 4 or by filing an action in the district
court to enforce the lien.5 The effect of the federal taxing statutes is to
create a garnishment in which the service of notice provided by statute
substitutes for court process which occurs in the ordinary garnishment
proceedings.6 Under the statutes7 providing for the district court's en-
forcement of an income tax lien, an action quasi in rem8 is permissible
against named defendants.9 In an action involving a tax lien, the nature
of defendant's right against his debtor must be determined by state law.' 0
In the present action, the government attempted to assert a lien on the
funds of Citibank which included the taxpayer's deposits in Citibank's
branch in Uruguay. Thus the court was faced with the problem of whether
accounts in a foreign branch bank are subject to an injunction by process
on the principal bank.
Although a branch bank is generally considered the agent of the
principal bank, for certain limited purposes branch banks are considered
separate entities." The doctrine that branch banks are separate entities
received its impetus from an early English decision.12 That court held
that a parent English bank was not subject to garnishment when the debtor
had deposits only with branches in Africa. The court reasoned that since
the depositor could only be repaid at the branch bank, the debt existed
only in Africa, and the property was not within the English jurisdiction.
A line of New York decisions has reached a similar conclusion respecting
3. INT. REv. CODE OV 1954, § 6322.
4. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6331 (a).
5. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, §§ 7402(a), 7403(a).
6. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6321, 6322, 6332(a, b); §§ 6331(a), 6332(b),
7402(a), 7403(a) ; see United States v. Eiland, 223 F.2d 118 (4th Cir. 1955).
7. INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, §§7402(a), 7403(a).
8. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 25 S.Ct. 625 (1905), which defined the
manner in which a state could constitutionally provide for process where a debt was
owed to a resident or nonresident by a resident or nonresident: (1) Personal service
must be obtained on the debtor of the defendant within the forum, (2) the situs of
the debt is where the debtor may be found, and (3) the defendant could have sued
the debtor in the state rendering the judgment.
9. United States v. Balanovski, 236 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
968, 77 S.Ct. 357 (1957).
10. See United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55, 78 S.Ct. 1054, 1057 (1958), which
held that the tax lien statute ". . . creates no property rights but merely attaches
consequences federally defined, to rights created under state law .. "
11. "A branch bank is not, of course, separately incorporated. Only one certificate
of incorporation is filed and only one corporation is brought forth into the business
world. Nothing appears more clear. Yet the notion has been extant for over a century
that for limited purposes a branch bank is a distinct business entity." Fordham,
Branch Banks as Separate Entities, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 975, 979 (1931).
12. Richardson v. Richardson & Nat'l Bank of India, Ltd., [1927] 137 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 492, 163 L.T. 450.
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the effect of local attachment on branch banks.13 In Chrzanowska v. Corn
Exchange Bank,'4 the court decided that in certain limited situations,
different branches, even in the same city, ". . . were separate and distinct
from one another as from any other bank."'u This separate entity concept
was affirmed in a subsequent case 16 and has since become deeply imbedded
in New York substantive law. In 1931, the New York court was presented
with a case with facts similar to those of the present case.' 7 The court
concluded that a non-resident defendant's deposit in a Puerto Rican branch
had its situs in Puerto Rico, and could not be reached by an attachment
proceeding in New York. The court stated: ". . . a branch bank being
separately indebted to its depositor, the existing obligation lies primarily
between such branch bank and its depositor and therefore the debt is
located in the country of the branch bank, not where the principal bank
is located.""' A recent New York decision 9 further substantiated the
separate entity doctrine on the policy theory that no branch could safely
pay a check drawn by its depositor without first conferring with all other
branches and the main office. The notification of attachment to every
branch would place an intolerable burden upon banking and commerce,
particularly where the branches were numerous2 ° and in distant corners
of the globe.21
The decision of the Circuit Court in the present case extends the
doctrine to apply in an injunction proceeding where there is no formal
attachment. The government apparently argued that while there was no
jurisdiction over the funds situated in Uruguay, there was personal juris-
diction over Citibank which had the power to order their branch bank to
withhold funds from the taxpayer. The government sought to accomplish
by injunction what it could not otherwise accomplish by lien in the absence
of jurisdiction over the property.
In rejecting this contention the court broadened the policy considera-
tions previously used to support the doctrine, placing emphasis on the un-
desirability of recognizing foreign injunctions on American branch banks
in similar circumstances. The court sought to avoid this possibility with
its potential to cripple the effectiveness of the banking system-the same
consideration which engendered the separate entity doctrine. As the law
presently appears, an American court could readily refuse to enforce a
foreign injunction because of the local policy that the separate entity
13. See Comment, Garnishment of Branch Banks, 56 MIcn. L. REv. 90 (1957).
14. 173 App. Div. 285, 159 N.Y. Supp. 385 (1916).
15. Id. at 291, 159 N.Y. Supp. at 388.
16. Pan-American Bank & Trust Co. v. National City Bank, 6 F.2d 762 (2d
Cir. 1925).
17. Bluebird Undergarment Corp. v. Gomez, 139 Misc. 742, 249 N.Y. Supp. 319(1931).
18. Id. at 744, 249 N.Y. Supp. at 321-22.
19. Cronan v. Schilling, 100 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), aff'd, 282 App.
Div. 940, 126 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1950).
20. Cronan v. Schilling, supra note 19, at 476.
21. Newtown Jackson Co. v. Animashaun, 148 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1955).
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doctrine establishes.2 2 Although in most recent cases foreign decrees are
being upheld, 23 a real necessity of safeguarding American citizens or insti-
tutions is sufficient to override the compelling comity reasons inducing
the enforcement of a foreign decree.24 In the instant case, if the separate
entity doctrine is not applied, the local policy that justifies ignoring the
foreign decree ceases, thereby clogging national banking channels with
foreign injunctions. As the court stated: "The untoward difficulties . . .
that such a doctrine would produce militate against giving it support here. '25
The dissenting opinion of Judge Hays inferred that the majority may
have decided the case on another issue.26 The dissenter implied that the
ratio of the case was that the preliminary injunction could not issue since
the government had not shown a reasonable probability of reaching the
defendant's property in the final adjudication. The time and case honored
condition for granting a preliminary injunction requires that plaintiff's
ultimate success in the pending action be reasonably probable.2 7 Here, the
court had neither personal nor quasi in rem jurisdiction over the ultimate
defendant. 28  Although normally the substantive issues in the case are
examined to determine reasonable probability, the requirement applies with
equal force to the issue of probable jurisdiction.29 The issue raised by the
dissent may have uncovered one basis for the decision. However, in view
22. American courts have refused to enforce judgments rendered in foreign coun-
tries when these judgments were contra to local policy. See De Brimont v. Penniman.
7 Fed. Cas. 309 (No. 3715) (C.C.N.Y. 1873), in which enforcement of a decree
by a French court for support of a son-in-law was refused; Vladikavkazsky Ry. Co.
v. New York Trust Co., 263 N.Y. 369, 189 N.E. 456 (1934), in which the court
refused to enforce a Russian confiscation decree on grounds of policy.
23. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 45 (1962).
24. See Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad,
50 COLUM. L. Rgv. 783, 798 (1950).
25. United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1963).
26. "The present issue as to property of the taxpayer which is held by appellant's
foreign branches is not, as the majority believes, whether that property can be reached
in the pending proceeding." Id. at 26.
27. Hall Signal Co. v. General Ry. Signal Co., 153 Fed. 907 (2d Cir. 1907:
Yonkers Raceway, Inc. v. Standardbred Owner's Ass'n, 153 F. Supp. 552 (S.D.N.Y.
1957); Nadya, Inc. v. Majestic Metal Specialties, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N.Y.
1954) Village of Owego v. Tioga County Agricultural Soc'y, 152 Misc. 544. 273
N.Y. Supp. 828 (1934) ; Adams Co. v. Buchanan, 42 S.D. 548, 176 N.W. 512 (1920) :
cf., Bernstein v. Herren, 136 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; Clifton Park Manor.
Section One, Inc. v. Mason, 137 F. Supp. 324 (D. Del. 1955); Acme Fast Freight,
Inc. v. United States, 135 F. Supp. 823 (D. Del. 1955) ; Davis Electronics Co. v.
Channel Master Corp., 116 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ; Miller v. Rudolph Wur-
litzer Co., 48 F. Supp. 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1942) ; Halsey, Stuart & Co. v. Public Serv.
Conim'n, 212 Wise. 184, 248 N.W. 458 (1933), in which a preliminary injunction
was issued only where complainant satisfied the court with reasonable certainty oi
his ultimate success on final hearing.
These rules are based on the premise that since a preliminary injunction is an
order made upon some right or principle upon which a final decree depends, the
courts will not grant the injunction unless plaintiff has shown the court an oppor-
tunity to succeed in the final adjudication. Consolidated Film Indus., Inc. v. Johnson.
21 Del. Ch. 417, 192 Atl. 603 (1937).
28. Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228 (1950).
29. A recent case has stated: ". . . substantial probability that the court will find
a basis for federal jurisdiction, like the probability of a plaintiff's success on the
merits, is a crucial element necessary to justify the issuance of an injunction pendente
lite.' A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. National Marine Eng'r Beneficial Ass'n, 250 F.2d 332,
337 (2d Cir. 1957).
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